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Bernd Remmele 
Two Peculiarities of Economic Education 
Zwei Besonderheiten ökonomischer Bildung
In order to model economic competences and to draw the didactic-methodological consequences it is necessary 
to take into account specific conditions of the conceptual development concerning economic issues and the 
respective learning paths. In this respect economic education has to deal with two fundamental peculiarities. 
First, the concept of the market as system unintendedly coordinating a multitude of actions is not transparent 
in the individual action. Thus, the learning paths to this concept of market cannot just build on the concept 
of the market as the concrete place of economic interactions. Second, the market’s systemic coordination of 
feedback processes, particularly the negative ones, is rather unintuitive. Intuition prefers unidirectional linear 
causal relations. These two interrelated peculiarities are present in the cognitive development of economic 
concepts. Competence requirements have to be defined respectively and methodological choices in teaching 
systemic ‘phenomena’ have to reflect this constraint. 
Um ökonomische Kompetenzmodelle zu entwickeln und daraus didaktisch-methodische Konsequenzen zu zie-
hen, ist es notwendig bestimmte Bedingungen der konzeptuellen Entwicklung ökonomischer Zusammenhänge 
sowie diesbezüglich relevante Lernwege zu berücksichtigen. In dieser Hinsicht muss sich ökonomische Bildung 
mit zwei Besonderheiten auseinandersetzen: Erstens, das Konzept des Marktes als System nicht-intendierter Ko-
ordination einer Vielzahl von Handlungen ist in der einzelnen Handlung nicht einsichtig. Daher kann der dieses 
Konzept betreffende Lernweg und entsprechende Lehrmethoden nicht einfach am Marktkonzept als konkreter 
Ort konkreter wirtschaftlicher Interaktionen ansetzen. Zweitens, die systemische Koordinationsleistung des 
Marktes in Bezug auf Rückkoppelungsprozesse, insbesondere negative Rückkoppelungen, ist relativ unanschau-
lich. Unsere Anschauung präferiert unidirektionale lineare kausale Verknüpfungen. Die beiden Besonderheiten 
stehen somit in engem Bezug zur kognitiven Entwicklung ökonomischer Konzepte. Kompetenzanforderungen 
und die Wahl von Lehr/Lernmethoden in Hinsicht auf systemische ‚Phänomene‘ müssen daher diese Bedingun-
gen bedenken.
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1. Introduction 
The definition of a competence model, particularly its 
stages, or the respective development of a curriculum 
have to take account of relating scientific concepts, 
but also of the general learning paths and abilities in 
respect of these concepts. Concerning this important 
relation economic education has to deal with – among 
a lot of other issues – two fundamental peculiarities 
specific to the domain. First, as the capacity of the 
market to coordinate a multitude of actions is an un-
intended systemic effect it is not present or transpar-
ent in individual action. Consequently – as a way to 
learn – it can hardly be extracted from the analysis 
of individual economic interactions, where intentions 
are usually used as a main category of conceptualiza-
tion. This is not only true for spontaneous concept 
development but also for didactically guided learn-
ing processes. Economic education has thus to rely 
on a more abstract approach to this concept, which 
also has to guide the definition of competences and 
respective stages.1 
The second peculiarity is closely related to the first 
one, as wi ll be shown below. The market‘s systemic 
coordination of feedback processes, particularly the 
negative ones, is rather unintuitive; this implies that 
concrete, i.e. mainly spatially structured, metaphors 
are rather misleading because they cannot (easily) rep-
resent the crucial relational structure of systemic co-
ordination. Methodological choices in teaching such 
systemic ‘phenomena’ have to reflect this constraint 
and resort to methods which tap other sources, par-
ticularly more temporally structured or intrinsically 
1 Retzmann et al. (2010) have outlined standards for economic 
education for general education. It distinguishes between 
three main fields of learning and instruction – broadly spea-
king: action, interaction and systems. This is in a very specific 
way unlike differentiations which directly build on differenti-
ations of science of economics (e.g. Kaminski et al. 2008: 8ff). 
With regard to competences it is insufficient to derive the dif-
ferentiation of basic fields of economic education from the sci-
entific domain. Due to the different learning paths particularly 
institutions have to be distinguished between transparent and 
intransparent ones, hence some ‘institutions’ belong to inter-
action and others refer to systems, as an own field of learning 
and instruction.
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more reflective metaphors as well as methods which 
unfold the specific relational structure. 
These peculiarities are consequences of a specific 
path of cognitive development in relation to specif-
ic economic concepts which have to be regarded in 
relation to their formal conceptual complexity. Defi-
nitions of economic competences and expectations 
concerning their development have thus to reflect the 
age-specific potential concerning the steps of the re-
spective learning paths referring to – among others 
– formal cognitive development. 
Until now these two peculiarities of economic edu-
cation are not sufficiently explored in the pertinent 
scientific discourse – neither concerning the respec-
tive conceptual development they are based on nor 
concerning competence-related didactical conse-
quences. The systemic perspective is not significantly 
differentiated concerning specific learning paths and 
their possible methodological-didactical framing. The 
structural dimension of metaphors is also hardly pres-
ent in the discourse of economic education. 
In the remainder this paper tries to bring together 
some theoretical approaches and some evidence as 
well as tentatively advance this scientific discourse. 
2.  The first peculiarity: two separate 
perspectives on economic phenomena 
Economic education has mainly to deal with foster-
ing two fundamental competences: on the one hand 
the ability to undertake or participate (in a reflective 
manner) in concrete economic actions or interactions, 
and on the other hand the ability to conceive and 
judge abstract economic processes and systems. This 
directly relates to two different perspectives on eco-
nomic phenomena, i.e. based on the individual and its 
actions or on the abstract functioning of the system. 
Accordingly, Hodgson (1993, 398) analyses theoreti-
cal approaches based on the divergence of starting 
from methodological individualism or “aggregates at 
the systemic level”. The claim of the first peculiarity 
that (unintended) systemic coordination of the mar-
ket is not transparent in the individual (intentional) 
action can be rephrased as a clear separation of the 
participant perspective and the observer perspective 
concerning economic phenomena. Concerning social 
knowledge there is in general the distinction between 
the participant perspective and observer perspective. 
The social knowledge of the participants is transpar-
ent during social action and a specific observer’s per-
spective taken by the interacting persons is important 
to control these interactions. The observer’s part can 
however also be a theoretical ex post construction 
which is not and cannot be part of the single inter-
actions. Taking account of both fundamental compe-
tences thus implies that the development, i.e. also 
conceptual development, of these perspectives has to 
be reflected.
It is a major achievement of Vygotsky (1986) that 
he systematically included formal instruction as an es-
sential factor in its own right into the theoretical dis-
cussion of conceptual development. His basic distinc-
tion of spontaneous and scientific concepts and his 
‘zone of proximal development’, which is mainly relat-
ed to the latter, scaffold this inclusion. Scientific con-
cepts can be represented verbally in instruction and 
can be developed by relating them to other concepts 
– at least partly independent of spontaneous concepts 
which are mainly based on ‘unconscious’ experience. 
From Vygotsky‘s point of view it is thus not impera-
tive that (top-down instruction of) scientific concepts 
have to be based on (bottom-up experience of) spon-
taneous concepts. “Scientific concepts would be un-
necessary if they were reflecting mere appearances 
of objects, as empirical concepts do. The scientific 
concept, thus, stands in a different relation to the ob-
ject, in a relation achievable only in conceptual form, 
which, in its turn, is possible only through a system of 
concepts.” (Vygotsky 1986, 173) It is an assumption 
of this paper that concerning the systemic nature of 
certain economic issues there is almost no alternative 
to such an conceptual approach; it has to be taught 
from an abstract scientific perspective – partly even 
wilfully distancing one’s perspective from spontane-
ous/empirical and thus intuitive concepts. 
On first sight it might however seem that also the 
systemic economic observer perspective could also be 
derived from the participant perspective by (instruc-
tionally guided) abstraction or decentration or respec-
tive learning paradigms. This might, e.g., be the case 
for social norms which are of course also relevant in 
economic interactions: “…the child can generate pre-
scriptions through abstractions form the experience 
itself (either as an observer or participant)” (Turiel 
1983, 43). Social norms reflect the balance of inten-
tions (interests) and can thus be abstracted and gen-
eralized from interactions. The observer can or even 
has to take the role of a participant to make the situa-
tion transparent, i.e. in this regard perspective taking 
and abstraction from this can even be a spontaneous 
process. 
However in relation to the market system the dis-
tinction between the two perspectives is a fundamen-
tal one. They are separate in a strong sense because 
the capacity of the market to coordinate a plethora 
of actions is a systemic and unintended effect, which 
cannot be abstracted from the characteristics given 
in the individual perspective. The core scientific con-
cepts in economics are thus not based on spontane-
ous ones, but have to be based on other (scientific) 
concepts and thus on formal instruction. 
This strong separation is thus a domain specific one 
as the high relevance of systems as ‘object’ of the ob-
server perspective is proper to the economic domain. 
The economic observer is a specific observer in the 
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respect that on the one hand the degree of systemic 
coordination exercised by the market forces, which are 
seen as externally determining (aggregated) behav-
iour, is very high.2 On the other hand economy has a 
high degree of relevance for everyday life in modern 
societies.
In accordance with the domain specific separation 
of perspectives there is discussion concerning false 
generalizations or ‘micro-macro-problems’ which deal 
with the problem of everyday abstractions from in-
dividual experiences and situations (for an overview 
Zoerner 2008). However it is not necessary to put 
wrongfully generalized lay theories under ‘ideology-
suspicion’ (‘Ideologieverdacht’; Krol et. al. 2001, 7), 
because it is primarily not a problem of hidden inter-
ests but of unreflected modes of thinking.
However the most salient example for the first pe-
culiarity, i.e. the strict separation of the participant 
and the observer perspective in the economic domain, 
is the two concepts of the market itself (and that they 
are frequently confounded). On the one hand there 
is the concept of market in the sense of a concrete 
place where single social (inter)actions are conducted. 
In each (inter)action a multitude of individual and 
social, intentional and structural dimensions is ac-
tive. Particularly economic sociology made aware of 
this inclusive concept of action. Analysis of individual 
‚market‘-oriented action should thus not reduce this 
action to its instrumental-rational dimension but take 
account of its “embeddedness” in wider social struc-
tures as well (cf. e.g. Granovetter 1985; Beckert 2003). 
On the other hand there is the concept of market in 
the sense of an abstract coordination system of social 
actions. This coordination is conceived in a way that 
it – unintendedly – interrelates only one dimension 
but of a multitude of actions. The one interrelated 
dimension is of course the instrumental-rational one 
with an optimization on ends and means concerning 
scarce resources (cf. e.g. Swedberg 2003, 109). Looking 
at the two concepts of market the use of the word 
‘market’ in the derived second sense is thus hardly a 
good metaphor as the ‘rules of reflection’ are almost 
completely different. The relation between the two 
markets is thus rather catachrestic.
We cannot elaborate much on the different appli-
cations of this differentiation. Just as one example 
2 On a general level the differentiation of the two perspectives 
reflects the differentiation of external and internal causation 
of behaviour. “The active/reactive dimension articulates one 
of the crucial differences between economics and psychology: 
‘active’ theories stress that human experiences and behaviour 
are initiated within the person; ‘reactive’ theories regard be-
haviour as a reaction to external environmental forces.” (Furn-
ham/Lewis 1986, 13) The active theories relate more to the 
internal and introspective dimension of the participant per-
spective whereas the reactive theories focus on the external 
and objectivist aspect of the observer perspective.
of making theoretical use of it Max Weber can be 
mentioned. Weber (1968, 635f) differentiates the 
two perspectives in the succession of barter interac-
tion. Whereas he relates the dickering to the systemic 
market concept he conceives the agreement or the 
contract in its individual complexity. “The completed 
barter constitutes a consociation only with the imme-
diate partner. The preparatory dickering, however, is 
always a social action insofar as the potential partners 
are guided in their offers by the potential action of an 
indeterminately large group of real or imaginary com-
petitors rather than by their own actions alone. The 
more this is true, the more does the market constitute 
social action. Furthermore, any act of exchange in-
volving the use of money (sale) is a social action sim-
ply because the money used derived its value from its 
relation to the potential action of others.” 
For specific business contracts or for sellers of 
goods it is probably ‚more true‘ that this is a conscious 
part of the social action. For the usual consumer in a 
Western shop this is surely ‘less true’ or not true. One 
accepts the price or not, the respective decisions of 
the others are not taken into account. Obviously, also 
Weber does not consider conscious reflection on the 
others as a criterion for this social action, as he surely 
does not assume that using money implies consider-
ations on the social creation or accreditation of its 
‘value’. The process of money-based social integration 
of the barter partners is thus in great parts not trans-
parent for them during that process. The example 
thus also shows that the temporal aspect is structur-
ally different to spatial relations as the past and the 
future are not a straight line but a condensed virtual 
bulk of diverse interactions. 
3.  The second peculiarity: unintuitiveness 
of the market as system 
This focus on the temporal dimension is crucial for the 
second peculiarity, i.e. unintuitiveness of the market 
as system, and didactic-methodological consequences 
as well. 
The cognitive structure which yields understanding 
of the systemic integration of a vast multitude of the 
economic dimension of actions goes far beyond the 
comprehension of a single integral action. Not only 
does it imply a ‘post-formal’ cognitive level, e.g. the 
specific integration of contextual factors (cf. Bassech-
es1984; Kramer, Kahlbaugh 1992; McBride 1998), but 
also – as part of it – the abandoning of intuitive forms 
of judgement. Though there are differences in the 
general psychological approach ‘system competence’ 
can be considered as one major aspect of post-formal 
development: in contrast to traditional developmen-
tal psychology which builds on reversibility (i.e. final-
ly time-neutrality) for the structuration of cognitive 
stages, approaches of ‘post-formality’ build on com-
plex dynamic concepts. This relates to research field 
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of systems dynamics as it deals with the behaviour 
of complex systems over time. In this regard systems 
dynamics focuses on dynamic interactions of differ-
ent factors and on the aggregate systemic behaviour 
of multitudes (cf. e.g. Resnick 1998; Sterman 2002; 
Booth Sweeney, Sterman 2007). There is also evidence 
that particular training in systems thinking based on 
specific simulations or practises improves respective 
competences (e.g. Kriz 2000, 270ff; Pala, Vennix 2005; 
Plate 2010). This is important development of poten-
tial teaching methods concerning systemic phenom-
ena in economy.
Now it can be made clear that the two peculiari-
ties are interrelated. The strict separation of the two 
perspectives is an effect of the ‘operational closure’ 
(Luhmann) of the market system. The systemic effects 
are ‘emergent’, i.e. on another level than the level of 
concrete interactions from which they ‘emerge’. Such 
a closure, based on systemic feedback processes, par-
ticularly negative feedback processes, however is dif-
ficult to grasp in contrast to the concrete level. The 
market‘s systemic coordination of feedback processes 
is thus far from being intuitive, in the sense that it is 
not given in a way easy to represent (eidetically). 
Intuition is to be understood as the usual form 
things are presented in imagination. So, in the classi-
cal Kantian sense intuitions are the imaginative form 
of sensual impressions, and as such they are bound 
to the structure of the pure forms of intuition, i.e. 
space and time (e.g. Kant 1933 §24). Intuitions are 
thus formed by the way our senses work and how our 
mental system integrates these impressions. In rela-
tion to external objects it is the spatial aspect which 
is relevant. Objects thus conform to specific spatial 
rules, concerning e.g. the additivity of distances or 
the order of directions. Whereas Kant took the pure 
forms as static in the frame of transcendental subjec-
tivity modern approaches, i.e. in regard to empirical 
subjects, have to take a dynamic stance (following e.g. 
Piaget, Inhelder 1948). Though there is significant in-
dividual development of spatiality, (physical) space 
sticks to some basics: e.g. an object cannot be at two 
places at the same time. What is however essential for 
the following argument is that forms of intuition are 
changeable also in the sense that they can be devel-
oped based on learning. In this regard, e.g., Schnelle 
(1980, 48) analyses forms of intuition in relation to 
the development of forms of ‘understanding’. 
So the point is not just the lack of a good spatial 
metaphor but a deep rooting inexpedience for such 
representation. Below some examples for this mis-
leading aspect will be given. Chi et al. (1994) describe 
this problem based on the fundamental ontological 
difference of categories of matter and process. Where-
as scientific concepts often refer to processes, initial 
concepts of students often refer to matter. Chi et al. 
conclude that conceptual change within concepts of 
matter is relatively easy; change from matter to pro-
cess however is a relatively hard learning process. 
A further aspect has to be mentioned here to ex-
plain the basic unintuitiveness of feedback processes. 
It is the fundamental focality of human consciousness 
which usually ties our imagination to certain spatio-
temporal and respective causal structures. As Varela 
(1975, 5) self-ironically states: „Self-reference is awk-
ward.“ Also for him the representational problem is a 
very deep one. The main problem is that on the one 
hand feedback loops are always already closed – i.e. 
from both sides. The dynamics of such structure is a 
major problem for our imagination because on the 
other hand the focality of human consciousness ties 
it to a single linear process: A causes B. Our usual form 
of awareness is fundamentally limited in this respect, 
we have to focus. “Apparently our cognition cannot 
hold both ends of a closing circle simultaneously; it 
must travel through the circle ceaselessly.” (Varela 
1975, 20) 
This problem becomes evident, e.g., in the fact that 
in a control circuit with two elements mostly one is 
conceived as the controller and other as the controlled 
– however concerning these functions they are actu-
ally indistinguishable from a theoretical point of view 
(Glanville 1988). The output of one is always already 
the input of the other. The thermostat controls the 
status of the room temperature, while the room tem-
perature controls the status of the thermostat. The 
teacher guides the students’ learning, while the stu-
dents’ learning feeds back on the teacher’s behaviour. 
A control circuit is always already a circuit. So you can 









) and follow these 
steps of causation. However this neglects the given 
closedness of the circuit: B(t
0
) already causes A(t
1
). 
Thus when sticking to intuitive linear analysis, which 
is a less elaborate approach (cf. e.g. Rosenberg 2002; 
Plate 2010), relevant systemic effects, like e.g. the pres-
ence of eigen-behavior, are difficult to imagine. 
Only a few examples or symptoms of the prob-
lem can be given here. It relates, e.g., to a feature of 
bounded rationality – with obvious consequences 
for the systemic understanding of the market. Simon 
(1993, 92ff) discusses the limitations of human atten-
tion concerning certain feedback processes. Facing 
the relation of inflation and unemployment or energy 
and environmental policy the focus of the argument 
is always on one element while the other is neglected. 
Also the critique of patterns of ecological reasoning in, 
e.g., the Report for the Club of Rome on the ‘Limits of 
Growth’ (1972) is significantly based on this argument. 
In addition to this general unintuitiveness of feed-
back loops the problem becomes even worse for nega-
tive feedbacks. Negative feedback has a (seemingly) 
paradoxical consequence: the effect of a process is 
the cause of an opposed process – something is the 
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cause of its negation. Consequently, developmental 
psychology shows that negative relations are under-
stood later than positive ones. So, e.g., generally in 
processes the positive relation between its ‘content’ 
(e.g. spatial distance) and its speed is understood ear-
lier than the inverse or negative relation between its 
duration and its speed (e.g. Remmele 2003, 73ff; Lei-
ser, Beth-Halachmi 2006, 8; further, binary relations 
are of course easier to understand than relations with 
more elements, e.g. Levin 1992, 16f; Webley 2005, 49f). 
In our case, the market system is a constellation of 
many elements (costs, supply, demand, price, price 
of possible substitutes etc.) tied together by positive 
as well as negative relations. Taking into account this 
complexity it is not surprising that the individual 
(and historical) development of economic understand-
ing requires time as well as effort and is highly de-
pendent on respective learning contexts – including 
formal approaches. 
Overall, the lacking intuitiveness of the market 
provides a conceptual frame for a set of theoretically 
not fully elaborated economic judgements, for which 
again only some arbitrary examples can be given here. 
In a study of Leiser and Drori (2005) about the under-
standing of inflation government as an (intentional) 
agent is taken as an isolated causal element where 
from an advanced (observer) perspective systemic ef-
fects are in place. “Understanding the process of infla-
tion requires understanding beyond the level of the 
individual. Specifically, it needs to relate aggregate 
values. It seems that high school students tend to 
remain at the level of ‘scripts’, standardized accounts 
of who does what, and why, which leads them to at-
tribute an excessive role to the government. In ac-
cordance with that Rosenberg (2002, 79ff) provides a 
more qualitative analysis of linear and systemic rea-
soning in relation to governmental action.3
Personification and the reference to single actions 
concerning the explanation of systemic market pro-
cesses is a cognitively not fully elaborated form of rea-
soning (cf. Fend 1991, 141). It is a significant aspect of 
cognitive development in the economic domain to re-
3 Though ‚conceptual change‘ is a widely discussed and re-
searched subject in the last decades Chi and Ohlsson (2005) 
state in relation to this scientific field that „the study of com-
plex declarative learning is still in its infancy and has not yet 
produced a unified theory or paradigmatic framework.“ The 
approaches they discuss (semantic networks, theories based 
on the differentiation of centre and periphery, and schemas 
as experiential patterns) can however clearly be based on 
Vygotsky‘s claim that conceptual development of scientific 
concepts needs instruction which relies on providing relations 
to other concepts of adequate complexity and abstractness. 
So the unintuitive and non-spontaneous character of systemic 
economic issues which are at stake here needs the social fra-
ming in the ‚zone of proximal development‘ with an already 
competent teacher or learning partner as learning guide, i.e. 
economic education requires professional economic teachers.
duce the reference to intentional actors in relation to 
a systemic phenomenon like inflation. Intention is an 
intuitive linear relation between – in its simple variant 
with two elements – the intention and the intended 
action/aim. “The more abstract and complex the phe-
nomena (e.g. inflation, market forces) and more par-
ticularly the more difficult it is to personify, the less 
children (even up to the age of 15) can understand it. 
Children, it seems, can understand the motives of in-
dividual actors, but not the cumulative or aggregated 
effect of people’s economic actions.” (Furnham, Lewis 
1986, 28) So confounding of the two concepts of mar-
ket, as expression of our first peculiarity, is itself an 
example of such unelaborated judgement. 
The consequences of this developmental scheme 
are far reaching because they also affect fundamental 
ethical issues. At the age of 7 or 8 children frequently 
assume a ‘just price’ that corresponds with the char-
acteristics of the traded good and implies a moral ob-
ligation for the seller. The detachment of price from 
concrete characteristics leading to a systemic concept 
which also includes the (legitimate) interests of the 
seller takes some years altogether (cf. Berti, Bombi 
1988, 126ff). 
Further, not to devaluate or not to morally judge 
economic action and the intention to make profit 
requires an advanced cognitive development. Adam 
Smith, who – as is well known – makes this claim for 
the butcher, baker and brewer etc. – makes clear in 
his ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’ that the role of in-
tentions is crucial for moral sentiments and that they 
have a fundamental social function (cf. Smith 1790, 
2.3.3). To abstain from such judgement is not easy and 
requires, e.g., the theoretical insight into the utilitaris-
tic efficiency of the market systems in relation to the 
whole society. Consequently the developmental stage 
of economic understanding has a significant influence 
on the ethical judgement of individuals concerning 
economic phenomena (cf. Walstad 1996). Accordingly 
the historical development of the theoretical (at least 
partial) exclusion of the economic sphere from moral 
claims is a major scientific ‘achievement’, which of 
course in further step can be contextually reframed 
again. Interestingly it was Adam Smith, who was 
also the first to systematically use negative feedback 
in his scientific considerations (Mayr 1987, 197; Rem-
mele 2003, 22, 56ff). It could even be said that the 
unintuitiveness of the systemic market mechanism is 
mirrored skewedly in his well know metaphor of the 
‘invisible hand’. It might be added, that it is not just a 
non-visible mechanism, but rather that is not working 
in a possibly visible way.
Hence it has finally to be mentioned that the re-
lation between the conceptual and the intuitive or 
concrete metaphorical is very complex here as it is 
difficult to determine whether the intuitive misun-
derstandings of systemic phenomena are due to the 
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lacking conceptual development or the chosen (spa-
tial) image, i.e. the general inexpedience of spatial 
metaphors for systemic phenomena. A first example 
is the concept of a border. The protectionism which 
can be enacted at the border of a state can be referred 
to the difficulty of grasping the abstract concept of 
comparative cost advantages or the imaginative 
strength of this basic spatial metaphor. On the one 
hand it is difficult to develop this aggregate concept, 
on the other hand it is difficult not use an image like 
‘border’, which contains something and ‘protects’ one 
side from the other. Another example, which uses a 
less concrete but still spatially structured metaphor, 
is the ‘fixed pie’ (cf. Enste et al. 2009, 63) which im-
plies the conservation of quantity (of volume or area). 
The frequent separation of distribution and produc-
tion of social welfare based on the intuition of a given 
amount of goods contradicts the ‘systematization’ of 
this problem, i.e. taking into account the incentive 
structure which is yielded by the distributive rule (for 
other distorting metaphors cf. Oberlechner et al. 2004, 
Mandelbrot, Hudson 2005).
4. Didactical consequences 
Against this backdrop we face significant didactical 
questions: when and how can the market as a system 
be taught? On the one hand it is necessary to develop 
realistic age-specific competence expectations and 
respective curricular standards. On the other hand 
economic education has to make clear how concrete 
didactic-methodological approaches deal with the in-
dependence and unintuitiveness of the systemic con-
cept of market. 
The claim for realistic competence expectations im-
plies a critique of the general postulation of ‘deficits’ 
based on the results of unreflected competence as-
sessments. In contrast it is necessary to take account 
of developmental paths and obstacles. Based on com-
petence measurement which did not take into account 
the mentioned peculiarities and their developmental 
background certain authors (e.g. Walstad, Larsen 1993, 
Sczesny, Lüdecke 1998, Klein, Meißner 1999) stated 
‘deficits’ in the students economic knowledge and 
understanding. These ‘deficits’ might thus not be the 
result of intellectual laziness or insufficient schooling 
(due to lacking economic competence of teachers or of 
insufficient representation of economic issues in the 
curricula etc.) but might just be an expression of the 
age specific level of reasoning. It can be shown, e.g., 
that test items in the Test of Economic Literacy imply 
elaborate systemic reasoning, but that there assumed 
competence level is regarded rather low. (cf. e.g. Rem-
mele 2009, 100) Generally it might also be argued that 
particularly multiple choice questionnaires are not 
the optimal test instrument for the evaluation of com-
plex reasoning.4
It is necessary to elucidate the respective age spe-
cific competence requirements on the basis of a test-
ed competence model for the economic domain. As 
such a model with validated competence levels is still 
a desideratum, the expectations can so far only be 
based on plausible argument. The paper already tried 
to give some orientation in this respect. Concerning 
the question when to expect and when reasonably to 
start to systematically teach systemic concepts one 
conclusion is that systemic reasoning – as a ‘post-for-
mal’ operation – has mainly to wait until the end of 
lower secondary education.
So finally, we have to distinguish different ap-
proaches to deal with the problem of teaching the 
systemic dimension of economy. The first approach 
follows the insight of Vygotsky that conceptual devel-
opment can and partly has to be grounded on concept 
based instruction. This can be called a “top-down re-
placement” (Chi, Ohlsson 2005), i.e. the presentation 
of an alternative concept in parallel with a prior or 
intuitive one, in a way that does not use the prior 
one as input. The old and the new representations 
then compete for the control of the field concerning 
explanation, problem solving etc. The more capable 
concept will then prevail. As often stated it is, e.g., 
sufficient to become a proper economist – even for a 
parrot – when you always say: ‘supply and demand’. 
Supply and demand is a concept, which is hard to de-
velop from everyday experience as it implies a specific 
aggregation of social phenomena, and shows thus al-
ready a scientific approach (cf. Davies 2006). So foster-
ing the use of these concepts in instruction can work 
in this formal concept based way.
In addition to such top-down methods also target-
oriented ‘horizontal’ methods could be useful to 
teach the market as a system. To do this more tem-
porally structured and more intrinsically reflective 
metaphors have to be taken into account. It has to be 
remembered therefore that intuition is not static, and 
it is not static in two different ways, which have been 
mentioned above. First, intuition can be developed in 
line with other elements of cognitive development (cf. 
Peirce 1981, 404f). Second, intuition is not static in 
the sense that it cannot process dynamic ‚rules of re-
flection‘, i.e. that which is transferred by a metaphor 
from one field of understanding to the other, at all. 
In general transfer might be possible from fields of 
knowledge where a more advanced ‘rule of reflection’ 
is already valid due to relevant reasoning or some 
kind of instruction as well as experience. 
4 ‘Deficits’ are particularly detected for girls; a great deal of re-
curring gender differences in such tests might however be rela-
ted to the test designs (cf. Davies et al. 2005).
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Weather is a rather familiar phenomenon which 
might make it easier to grasp other complex dynamic 
phenomena. At least in Central Europe the weather is 
expected to change permanently though having sea-
sonal characteristics and weather forecast often have 
a scientific appeal concerning the interdependencies 
of high and low pressure areas etc. Weather could thus 
be an adequate metaphor for equilibrium processes, 
which can be found also in economy from time to 
time. Accordingly examples from biological evolution 
could help to grasp feedback systems generating, e.g., 
ups and downs of populations of connected species 
(hunter and prey). One could even think of teenage 
cat fights as example of a complex dynamic system 
which is in its overall outlook constantly sensitive to 
nuances of individual behaviour and leads to dynamic 
balances of rapprochement and alienation between 
the bigger set of involved teenagers and which is also 
constantly reflective and analytic to these nuances. 
This last aspect might be used to demonstrate the ag-
gregated psychological influences in market processes. 
It remains of course a question of individual method-
ological creativity to choose an adequate example for 
a specific topic in class. The point here is to show that 
there are examples, even if they might be considered 
strange at first sight.
Finally, a more direct approach to the topic has 
to be mentioned. There are methods that allow un-
folding the compressed temporal-relational structure 
which are bulked together in certain conditions of 
individual action, e.g. prices. With simulations the 
systemic effects can be stretched and simplified in 
a way that the aggregate actions and decisions of 
an ‚indeterminately large group of real or imaginary‘ 
persons reach a state of more transparency. If the 
complexity of systemic coordination of economic 
actions cannot be experienced in reality respective 
virtual experience might be provided in class (cf. e.g. 
Egenfeldt-Nielsen 2007, 100ff). The process character 
of systemic economic phenomena can, e.g., be expe-
rienced in auctions or competitive simulation games. 
The form of the coordination can be perceived as the 
numerically reduced sequence (and interrelation) of 
decisions. A further possibility is usage of (computer-
based) simulations of feedback-systems which can be 
manipulated by the students and thus give an impres-
sion of the causal interrelation of inputs and relational 
variables (e.g. Arndt 2007). This is again rather a top-
down approach as the target concept is build into the 
structure of these interrelations. Whether top-down 
or horizontal it should be clear now that bottom-up 
from everyday experience is at best an exception.5
5 Purchasing power might be considered such an example: 
purchasing power is not experienced in everyday life as it is im-
plicit in money. However, particularly during holidays abroad 
the aggregated dimension of purchasing power or its compa-
rative nature is an eternal source of irritation: ‘everything is so 
cheap/expensive here’.
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